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Quasi-Constitutional Amendments
RICHARD ALBERT†
INTRODUCTION—A PHENOMENON AND ITS FEATURES
Defining what counts as a constitutional amendment has
proven difficult for scholars of constitutional change.1 In 
master-text constitutional democracies like the United
States, some constitutional amendments may change the 
constitutional text but not its meaning, others may change 
its meaning but not its text, and still others may change both 
the text and its meaning.2 The same definitional challenge 
confronts Canada. Its inherited traditions of unwritten
constitutional norms combine sometimes uneasily with the 
modern vanguard of “written-ness” to complicate how we 
identify a constitutional change that amounts to a
constitutional amendment.
† Professor and Nicholson Scholar, Boston College Law School. Email:
richard.albert@bc.edu. For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to
Dennis Baker, John Helis and Adam Perry. I have also benefitted from
presenting an earlier draft of this Article at the Second Beetz-Laskin Conference
on Canadian Constitutional Law, organized by Noura Karazivan, Jean Leclair
and Patrick Macklem at the University of Montreal, and at the Policy Impact
conference, hosted by Emmett Macfarlane at the University of Waterloo. I thank
the members of the editorial team at the Buffalo Law Review—especially Mary
Aldridge and Emily Stoufer-Quinn—for their excellent work in preparing this
Article for print, and for inviting scholars writing in the field to publish response
papers to this piece. As always, the Boston College Law School Fund has provided 
generous funding to support my research for this Article.
1. See, e.g., ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS 55–59 (2009); Sanford Levinson, How Many Times has the United
States Constitution Been Amended? (A) < 26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) > 27: Accounting
for Constitutional Change, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 13, 25–32 (Sanford Levinson ed.,
1995).
2. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1459 (2001).
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These definitional challenges have grown even more 
complicated in recent years as both master-text and partially
codified constitutional democracies have seen the rise of a
curious phenomenon resulting from the marriage of 
constitutional law and politics: quasi-constitutional
amendments. A quasi-constitutional amendment is a sub-
constitutional alteration to the operation of a set of existing
norms in the constitution. It is a change that does not possess
the same legal status as a constitutional amendment, that is 
formally susceptible to statutory repeal or revision, but that
may achieve the function though not the formal status of 
constitutional law over time as a result of its subject-matter
and importance—making it just as durable as a
constitutional amendment.
A. The Canadian Bill of Rights 
The Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 was a quasi-
constitutional amendment. Passed as a simple statute in
Parliament, the government of the day had high ambitions
for it.3 The Justice Minister compared it to the Magna Carta, 
declaring that the government was “not enacting legislation
for today only, or for this generation only, but that we are 
placing on our statute books legislation which we hope will
have validity and effect in future generations.”4 He insisted
that the Bill of Rights would “become part of our constitution
just as the Senate and House of Commons Act, the Supreme 
Court Act of 1875, the Yukon Territories Act, and Northwest
Territories Act became part of our constitution just as soon
3. The Bill of Rights was rooted in what Janet Hiebert calls “a novel (if not 
naïve) idea: creating a rights culture in governing that did not depend,
exclusively, on judicial review.” Janet L. Hiebert, Parliamentary Bills of Rights:
An Alternative Model?, 69 MOD. L. REV. 7, 12 (2006). It created a duty on the 
Justice Minister to review every government bill for consistency with the list of
recognized rights and freedoms, and to report any inconsistency to the House of
Commons. S.C. 1960, Pt. I, § 3(1).
4. House of Commons Debates, July 7, 1960, 3d Sess., 24th Parl.,v. VI 8–9,
at 5885 (Can.).
   
       
      
       
        
       
          
     
       
         
      
       
        
    
       
       
        
        
       
      
        
        
      
   
   
       
      
     
 
     
   
     
   
            
      
   
2017] QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 741
as they were passed by parliament.”5 The Minister added
that “this bill of rights, although a statute of the parliament
of Canada and not an amendment to the British North
America Act, will be of equal force and effect as part of the 
Constitution of Canada.”6 In short, the Bill of Rights would
not be an ordinary law despite its legal status as just that.
Even more revealing was the admission from the 
government that it would have been “impossible” to enact the 
Bill of Rights as a constitutional amendment binding on both
federal and provincial actors.7 The government conceded
that “the indications are clear that it would not be possible 
to get early agreement with the provinces for an amendment
of the nature suggested”8 when it was confronted with the 
criticism that there had been no provincial consultation and
that the Bill of Rights should have introduced protections for
rights and freedoms beyond only federal jurisdiction. Soon
after the Bill of Rights was enacted, Bora Laskin suggested
that although the Bill of Rights was a mere statute subject
to ordinary repeal, it could over time become the beneficiary
of “such reinforcement as may come from its public character
and from public vigilance.”9 Laskin recognized that the Bill
of Rights could conceivably acquire special salience in law
because of its significance in society.10 
B. Origins, Advantages and Risks 
All quasi-constitutional amendments share one common
point of origin, three distinct advantages, as well as three 
serious risks. As to their origins, quasi-constitutional
amendments are the result of a self-conscious circumvention
5. Id. at 5886.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 5887.
8. Id.
9. Bora Laskin, Canada’s Bill of Rights: A Dilemma for the Courts?, 11 INT’L 
& COMP. L. Q. 519, 533 (1962).
10. Id.
      
       
       
     
     
     
       
      
       
      
      
     
   
      
    
     
        
     
      
       
     
        
     
      
     
    
      
      
       
   
      
      
       
     
     
    
       
   
742 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
of onerous rules of formal amendment in order to alter the 
operation of a set of existing norms in the constitution. We 
are likely to see quasi-constitutional amendments in states
whose constitutions are difficult to amend formally, often
federal countries. Where constitutional actors determine,
correctly or not, that the current political landscape would
frustrate their plans for a constitutional amendment to 
entrench new policy preferences, they resort instead to sub-
constitutional means—for instance, legislation or political
practice—whose success requires less or perhaps even no 
cross-party and inter-institutional coordination.
Quasi-constitutional amendments entail three 
advantages for dominant constitutional actors. First,
resorting to quasi-constitutional amendment allows
constitutional actors to secure the functional equivalent of a
constitutional amendment at a much lower political cost.
Second, quasi-constitutional amendment has near-certain
likelihood of success in light of the fewer veto opportunities
standing in the way. Third, under the right conditions, a 
quasi-constitutional amendment may ultimately become as
functionally durable as a formal amendment even though it
may be formally subject to ordinary legislative repeal.
Yet even as quasi-constitutional amendments offer these 
important advantages to dominant constitutional actors,
they nonetheless expose the constitution to three nontrivial
risks. First, they blur the line separating the constitutional
from the non-constitutional, and risk obscuring the ordinary
hierarchy of authority in a constitutional democracy. Second,
recourse to these sub-constitutional strategies for
constitution-level changes may reveal and moreover
reinforce a mismatch between constitutional design and
political practice that constitutional actors can in turn
exploit for politically expedient purposes. Third, 
circumventing the rules of formal amendment undermines
the constitution itself and the very purpose of codification. I 
develop each of these critiques later in the text.
In this Article, I illustrate the phenomenon of quasi-
   
    
      
     
        
     
     
     
      
     
       
      
      
      
       
       
      
     
        
      
       
      
      
       
        
          
       
       
            
      
       
       
 
 11. See DONALD S. LUTZ, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 170 tbl.5.7 
(2006) (ranking the United States and Australia as two of the most rigid 
constitutions in his sample of study). 
 12. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 
1215, 1216 (2001). 
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constitutional amendment with reference to the Constitution
of Canada—perhaps the world’s most difficult to amend. I
begin by identifying two additional quasi-constitutional
amendments in Canada, both created after Patriation. I
separate them into two major categories according to their
form: one quasi-constitutional amendment made by ordinary
law, and another made extra-legally outside the ordinary
process of lawmaking. I then trace the phenomenon of a
quasi-constitutional amendment in Canada to the difficulty
of formal amendment. I subsequently explain how the legacy
of formal amendment failure in Canada has made it
politically attractive, if not necessary, for constitutional
actors to innovate quasi-constitutional amendment as a new
path to institutional reform. I close with reflections on the 
forms and limits of constitutional change in Canada and
what quasi-constitutional amendment teaches us about the 
constitutional text and its context.
I stress at the outset, however, that this phenomenon of 
quasi-constitutional amendment is not limited to Canada.
For instance, scholars have observed what I define as quasi-
constitutional amendments in the United States and
Australia, two rigid constitutional democracies,11 both rooted
in a master-text constitution. William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn have identified in the United States what they call
a super-statute, which is a law or cluster of laws that “seeks
to establish a new normative or institutional framework for
state policy” and “stick[s]” over time in the “public culture”
in a way that it and its principles “have a broad effect on the 
law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the 
statute.”12 The laws they identify as super-statutes, for
instance the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Civil Rights Act of 
      
     
     
     
     
  
     
      
       
    
     
      
      
     
       
      
   
      
     
        
  
        
      
       
       
        
       
 
     
     
      
          
       
     
     
        
    
744 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
1964,13 have acquired a special “normative force” gradually 
over time.14 Eskridge and Ferejohn understand super-
statutes as mediating the difficulty of constitutional
amendment with the core principle of popular sovereignty in
the United States.15 
In Australia, Scott Stephenson has observed
constitution-level changes resulting from what he identifies
as “constitutional statutes,” defined as laws that have “the 
function of regulating a fundamental feature of the 
lawmaking process,”16 where “[t]he lawmaking process is
broadly understood to include not only the enactment of law
by the legislature, but also the application of law by the 
executive and the interpretation of law by the judiciary.”17 
Examples of constitutional statutes in Australia, which I
might well understand as quasi-constitutional amendments,
include statutes governing the administrative state, like the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1976 as well
as rights-protecting statutes, both passed, Stephenson
suggests, at least partly as a result of constitutional
amendment difficulty.18 
In the British tradition, Adam Perry and Farrah Ahmed
have also theorized the concept of a “constitutional statute,”
which they define as a law that is “about state institutions
and which substantially influences, directly or indirectly,
what those institutions can and may do.”19 For them, the 
Scotland Act of 1998, the European Communities Act 1972,
13. Id. at 1231–42.
14. Id. at 1270.
15. See id. at 1267–71.
16. Scott Stephenson, The Rise and Recognition of Constitutional Statutes 2
(Sept. 26, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
17. Id. at 2–3.
18. Id. at 6–8.
19. Farrah Ahmed & Adam Perry, Constitutional Statutes, 37 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 461, 471 (2016).
   
       
     
       
      
       
       
      
     
     
    
    
      
 
      
     
     
      
         
     
   
     
        
    
     
 
      
     
          
            
        
          
      
    
2017] QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 745
and the Human Rights Act 1998 are all examples of 
constitutional statutes.20 Although the British Constitution
is disaggregated over many texts and conventions, the 
judicial and political recognition of constitutional statutes
may have the effect of creating what Perry and Farrah
describe as a “graduated legal system” that distinguishes the 
constitutional from the non-constitutional.21 It is in the 
interstices of constitutionality and sub-constitutionality that
we find quasi-constitutional amendments. It is therefore 
possible that we might find quasi-constitutional
amendments also in the few constitutional democracies like 
the United Kingdom with uncodified and disaggregated
constitutions.
I. ONE STATUTE AND A COMMITTEE 
Quasi-constitutional amendments are not all created in
the same way.22 They may arise in the course of the normal
legislative process, using the same institutions and rules
commonly used to pass an ordinarily-entrenched statute,
and may at that time or later be identified as a quasi-
constitutional amendment. Constitutional actors may also 
make a quasi-constitutional amendment extra-legally—that 
is without engaging the formal legislative process at all. In 
this Part, I illustrate how each of these routes has been used
to produce a quasi-constitutional amendment in Canada.
A. Ordinary Lawmaking 
Consider first the Regional Veto Law. It is an ordinary
20. Id. at 465, 471–72.
21. Id. at 464.
22. This is an important distinction from quasi-constitutional statutes in
Canada, which are enacted just as other laws are, only “they are interpreted in 
the broad and generous manner usually reserved for constitutional rights” and
they “trump later, conflicting ordinary laws unless those laws provide otherwise.” 
Vanessa MacDonnell, A Theory of Quasi-Constitutional Legislation, 53 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 508, 510 (2016).
      
        
     
     
    
     
      
        
          
      
        
    
     
     
       
      
         
      
     
        
 
     
       
 
         
          
        
           
   
   
   
          
           
         
      
           
        
         
     
746 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65
statute passed by Parliament in 1996 shortly after the 1995
Quebec referendum.23 The Regional Veto Law fulfilled the 
federal government’s promise to give Quebec a veto over
future constitutional amendments—a pledge made as an
inducement to encourage Quebec voters to reject secession.24 
The Regional Veto Law does for Quebec the same thing
it does for the other regions of Canada, with the exception of 
the North.25 It gives them each a veto in the constitutional
amendment process.26 The veto may be exercised by Ontario,
Quebec, British Columbia and at least two provinces from
each of the Atlantic and Prairie regions where the two 
represent at least half of the regional population.27 The 
Regional Veto Law gives the veto to these regions indirectly
through the federal government.28 It requires a Cabinet
minister to first obtain the consent of each of the five major
regions as well as a majority of all provinces before
introducing a major amendment proposal under the 
multilateral default amendment procedure.29 The Regional
Veto Law therefore confers a functional veto, not a formal
one.
The Regional Veto Law has two important consequences.
For one, it transforms the formal equality of the provinces
23. See An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, (S.C. 1996, c. 1) (Can.).
24. See Robert A. Young, Jean Chrétien’s Québec Legacy: Coasting then 
Stickhandling Hard, 9 REV. CONST. STUD. 31, 38 (2004).




29. Id. Canada’s Constitution entrenches five amendment procedures. Three
of them already give each of the affected provinces a veto over an amendment:
the unilateral provincial procedure, the regional amendment procedure and the
unanimity procedure. The fourth—the unilateral federal procedure—authorizes
Parliament to amend its own internal constitution, and therefore makes no
provision for provincial involvement. It is the fifth procedure—the multilateral
default amendment procedure—that the Regional Veto Law was intended to
address. See infra notes 58–67 and accompanying text.
   
       
       
      
       
     
        
      
       
       
   
      
          
      
     
     
     
     
    
      
       
       
    
     
       
      
     
      
       
    
 
             
       
 
     
       
          
2017] QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 747
under the Constitution’s amendment rules into a deep formal
inequality, giving special status to Ontario, Quebec and
British Columbia and diminishing the power of the other
seven provinces.30 As Andrew Heard and Tim Swartz 
explain, the multilateral default amendment procedure has
never really treated provinces as functional equals; populous
provinces could always exercise more power than the others
when they stood together.31 The Regional Veto Law now
formalizes and exacerbates what had before been only an 
implicit provincial inequality.
Second, the Regional Veto Law adds a new hurdle to 
what is already a difficult amendment process. It imposes a
prior restraint on the power of Cabinet ministers to propose 
an amendment—something not contemplated by the 
constitutional amendment rules themselves.32 It also 
complicates amendment under the multilateral default
procedure by changing the sequence for a successful
Parliament-initiated amendment: the Constitution requires
federal proposal, then provincial ratification, but the 
Regional Veto Law now requires provincial consent, then
federal proposal, and finally provincial ratification.33 This
has the potential to exacerbate amendment difficulty
because the provincial government that would grant its 
consent prior to the federal proposal might differ from the 
one that controls the assembly when the time later comes to 
formally ratify the amendment. The Regional Veto Law,
passed as a simple statute, therefore now constrains the 
federal government and indeed all constitutional actors
contemplating major constitutional change.
30. Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, The Regional Veto Formula and its Effects
on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment Process, 30 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 339, 340–41 
(1997).
31. Id. at 341.
32. See infra notes 57–68 and accompanying text.
33. See An Act Respecting Constitutional Amendments, supra note 23.
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B. Extra-Legal Change 
Turn now to what one prominent scholar has called the 
“frustrating puzzle” of Senate reform34—a subject of 
enduring debate since Confederation.35 It took nearly 150 
years for constitutional actors to change the Senate in any
material way.36 On January 19, 2016, the Minister of 
Democratic Institutions and the Government Leader in the 
House of Commons announced an Independent Advisory
Board for Senate Appointments.37 The Advisory Board is not
formalized in a law. Its stated purpose is to create a “new,
non-partisan, merit-based process to advise on Senate 
appointments.”38 Its larger purpose is to create an
“independent appointments process” that will “contribute to 
creating a less partisan and more effective institution to 
serve Canadians.”39 
According to the official release, the Advisory Board was
“established to provide advice to the Prime Minister on
candidates for the Senate” and will be “guided by public, 
merit-based criteria in order to identify Canadians who 
would make a significant contribution to the work of the 
Senate.”40 The Government moved expeditiously on Senate 
reform to secure the Senate’s “fundamental role in the 
representation of regional and minority interests in the 
34. C.E.S. Franks, The Senate and its Reform, 12 Queen’s L.J. 454, 454 (1987).
35. ROBERT A. MACKAY, THE UNREFORMED SENATE OF CANADA 1 (1926).
36. One important change, effective as of 1965, requires Senators to retire by
age seventy-five. Constitution Act, 1965, c 4, § 29(2) (Can.).
37. For a comprehensive catalogue of official announcements related to the
new appointment process, see Senate Appointment Resources (June 23, 2017),
https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/senate-appointment-
process.html.
38. Press Release, Gov’t of Can., Government Announces Immediate Senate
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legislative process.”41 
The Government established six categories of merit-
based criteria.42 The first relates to gender, indigenous, and 
minority status, with a view to gender balance in the 
Senate.43 Non-partisanship and personal qualities of 
integrity and ethical conduct are also important, as is
knowledge of the legislative process and the Constitution.44 
The Advisory Board will also look favorably on bilingual
candidates and on nominees who have a record of leadership
or achievement in public or community service, or in service 
to their profession or field of expertise.45 
The new Senate appointments process has unfolded in
two phases.46 During the first phase, called the “transitional
process,” the Advisory Board made appointment
recommendations to the Prime Minister in early 2016 to fill
Senate vacancies in Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec.47 For
each vacancy—five in total were identified—the Advisory
Board prepared a list of five individuals who, in its
estimation, deserve consideration for appointment to the 
Senate, and who “meet the constitutional eligibility
requirements at the time of the appointment to the 
Senate.”48 The Advisory Board is said to have consulted
broadly to ensure that a “diverse slate of individuals with a
variety of backgrounds, skills, knowledge and experience”
41. Id.
42. Huguette LaBelle, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT ADVISORY BOARD FOR 
SENATE APPOINTMENTS PERMANENT PROCESS (JULY TO NOVEMBER 2016) (2016) 
[hereinafter Independent Advisory Board].
43. Id. at 7–8.
44. See id. at 14.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 13–50. The constitutional requirements relate to age (between 30 
and 75), citizenship, real and personal property, and residency. Id.
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required for a well-functioning Senate were nominated for
the Board’s consideration.49 The Prime Minister ultimately
nominated seven women and men to the Senate, three from
Ontario and two each from Manitoba and Quebec.50 
The second phase in the new process was launched in
July 2016.51 It is described as “the permanent phase of the 
independent Senate appointments process,” a process that
now “features an application process that is open to all
Canadians.”52 The first round of the application process was
open for a four-week period ending on August 4, 2016.53 In 
this permanent phase, the Advisory Board will be guided by
the same criteria as the first “with the end goal of ensuring
a high standard of integrity, collaboration, and non-
partisanship in the Senate.”54 
II. FORMAL AMENDMENT DIFFICULTY IN CANADA 
Neither the Regional Veto Law nor the new Senate 
appointments process could have been formalized in a
constitutional amendment. The Constitution is just too rigid
and the constitutional politics of amendment are just too 
fraught with the risk of failure. A leading authority on the 
Canadian Constituion quite rightly identifies constitutional
design as a key source of Canada’s challenges:
49. Id. at 10.
50. Prime Minister Announces Intention to Recommend the Appointment of
Seven New Senators, GOV’T CAN. (March 18, 2016), http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/ 
2016/03/18/prime-minister-announces-intention-recommend-appointment-
seven-new-senators.
51. Minister of Democratic Institutions Announces Launch of the Permanent





54. Independent Advisory Board, supra note 42.
   
         
         
        
           
         
          
 
     
    
       
       
     
   
      
    
      
     
     
       
    
       
      
       
 
          
        
 
          
    
    
           
         
               
                
     
2017] QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS 751
Successful constitutions divide into two main groups: those that are
short, contain statements of abstract principles, and are difficult to
amend; and those that are long, contain detailed provisions, and are
relatively easy to amend. . . . Canada has a constitution that is
difficult to amend yet includes many details. Not surprising, this
approach has proven unsuccessful. We have the worst of both
worlds.55 
The Constitution of Canada entrenches an escalating
structure of five procedures of formal amendment.56 Each 
may be used to amend specifically designated provisions and
principles, and each rises in difficulty according to the 
importance of its associated provisions or principles.57 
Although some of the five amendment procedures are 
relatively easy and others are not, the complexity of the 
entire package of formal amendment rules may make the 
Constitution of Canada the most difficult in the democratic
world to amend—not necessarily a badge of honor.58 
A. The Rules of Constitutional Amendment 
The lowest amendment threshold is the unilateral
provincial procedure. It authorizes a provincial assembly to 
unilaterally amend the provincial constitution.59 The next-
lowest threshold, the unilateral federal procedure, confers an
analogous power upon the Parliament of Canada: the power
to unilaterally amend what Ian Greene has described as
55. C.E.S. Franks, Representation and Policy-Making in Canada, in CANADA’S 
CENTURY: GOVERNANCE IN A MATURING SOCIETY 68, 81 (C.E.S. Franks et al. eds.,
1995).
56. Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules, 49
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 944–45 (2014).
57. See id.
58. See Richard Albert, The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in
Canada, 53 ALTA. L. REV. 85, 105–06 (2015). Canada’s Constitution may be the
most difficult to amend only as relates to its basic structure. See id. at 96.
59. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11, §
45 (U.K.) [hereinafter Constitution Act, 1982].
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Parliament’s internal constitution60 and matters relating
exclusively “to the executive government of Canada or the 
Senate and House of Commons.”61 The third amendment
route, the regional amendment procedure, incorporates the 
major feature of the unilateral federal amendment
procedure: it applies to amendments affecting “one or more,
but not all, provinces” and requires the consent of the House 
of Commons and Senate, and also the approval of the 
legislative assemblies of the affected provinces.62 This
procedure must be used for amendments that have a
provincial-federal interest in relation to at least one province 
and be at most regional, not national, in scope.63 
The two remaining amendment procedures are the most
difficult. The multilateral default procedure applies to all
subjects not otherwise assigned to a specific amendment
procedure. It applies also exclusively to a specially
designated class of subjects including proportional
representation in the House of Commons, the powers and
membership of the Senate (including the method of 
senatorial selection), the Supreme Court of Canada for all
items except its composition, the creation of new provinces,
and the boundaries between provinces and territories.64 A 
successful amendment under this procedure requires
approval from both federal and provincial actors: the House 
of Commons and the Senate, as well the provincial legislative 
assemblies of at least two-thirds of the provinces whose 
aggregate population amounts to at least half of the national
60. Ian Greene, Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States, 
in CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 249, 251 
(Stephen L. Newman ed., 2004).
61. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 59, § 44.
62. Id. § 43.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 42.
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total.65 This is an onerous threshold by any measure.
The unanimity procedure is even more difficult than the 
multilateral default procedure. It requires the approval of 
both houses of Parliament and each provincial legislative 
assembly.66 This procedure must be used for amendments
involving the monarchy, the right to provincial
representation in the House of Commons relative to the 
Senate, Canada’s official languages beyond their provincial
or regional use, the composition of the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and Canada’s formal amendment rules
themselves.67 Each of these five procedures, then, requires a
greater quantum of agreement than the former, from a
simple unicameral majority to successfully pass an
amendment using the unilateral provincial procedure all the 
way up to the agreement of all federal and provincial
legislatures, under the unanimity rule. In this escalating
structure of amendment, the difficulty of amendment rises
according to the importance of the amendable matter, the 
variable being the degree of provincial consent required for
ratification.
B. The Constitution in Comparative Perspective 
By comparison with other democratic constitutions, the 
Constitution of Canada may well be the most rigid, but only
as to matters that Peter Russell has identified as involving
“mega constitutional politics.” The term refers to 
amendments that “address the very nature of the political
community on which the constitution is based,”68 that have a
“tendency to touch citizens’ sense of identity and self-
65. Id. § 38(1).
66. Id. § 41.
67. Id.
68. See PETER H. RUSSELL, CONSTITUTIONAL ODYSSEY: CAN CANADIANS BECOME 
A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE? 75 (1992).
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worth,”69 and those that are “concerned with reaching
agreement on the identity and fundamental principles of the 
body politic.”70 The escalating structure of amendment
identifies which matters trigger mega constitutional politics:
the ones amenable by either the default multilateral
amendment procedure, or the unanimity procedure. Both
authorize major reforms to the basic structure of the 
Constitution, for instance to the framework of government,
to the polity, to Canadian identity, or to federal-provincial
relations.
We cannot know for certain whether these amendment
procedures do in fact make the Canadian Constituion the 
most difficult to amend because the leading comparative 
study of constitutional rigidity has excluded Canada from
the study sample.71 The reason why is telling. Donald Lutz,
the political scientist who created the index, admitted that
he could not reliably determine what has constitutional
status in Canada, and therefore what counts as an
amendment to its Constitution.72 However, had he measured
these two onerous amendment procedures in Canada, he 
might have found that they rank the country ahead of the 
difficulty score Lutz had calculated for the United States
(5.10), the most rigid constitution in his 36-country sample.73 
Using Lutz’s own methodology, which quantifies every
possible step in a formal amendment process and then
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Lutz, supra note 12, at 6 tbl.I.I. It is moreover difficult to quantify what
scholars have referred to as “amendment culture,” which may be more
determinative of formal amendment difficulty than the amendment procedures
themselves. See generally Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the
Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the
Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 686 (2015)
(explaining theory of “amendment culture).
72. See Lutz, supra note 11, at 179 n.16.
73. See id. at 170 tbl.5.7.
   
       
    
       
       
     
       
      
       
      
   
        
      
      
      
      
     
      
     
     
       
  
        
    
     
       
    
   
    
      
 
 74. See Albert, supra note 58, at 94, 99–100. 
 75. Id. at 99–100. 
 76. See Lutz, supra note 11, at 170 tbl.5.7. 
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aggregates the scores of each discrete step in a given
amendment procedure to generate its index of difficulty, we 
arrive at an index of 4.50 for the multilateral default
procedure, and 5.00 for the unanimity procedure.74 Yet as I 
have shown elsewhere in detail, Canada’s formal
amendment rules have been informally amended by judicial
interpretation, parliamentary and provincial laws, and
perhaps also by constitutional convention such that their
outer measure of formal amendment difficulty under Lutz’s
scale may be upwards of 8.00.75 
It is telling that Lutz could not determine what has
constitutional status in Canada. This problem of 
identification—what the constitution is, and precisely where
it is—has made it possible for constitutional actors to exploit
the blurred distinction between constitutional and ordinary
law to create quasi-constitutional amendments that may
later mature into constitution-level changes. As I will
suggest below, quasi-constitutional amendments are not
fated to achieve constitutional status, though in some 
circumstances, they may well become as durable as formal
constitutional amendments.
III. THE CONSEQUENCE OF FORMAL AMENDMENT DIFFICULTY 
Equally telling is that many of the most formally rigid
constitutional democracies have generated the phenomenon
of quasi-constitutional amendment. It is no coincidence that
constitutional actors in Canada, the United States, and
Australia have have found recourse in sub-constitutional
means to make constitution-level changes. These 
constitutions are extraordinarily difficult to amend,76 
perhaps even constructively unamendable for all but the 
      
     
     
  
      
     
        
      
       
      
     
       
       
      
     
       
  
     
    
    
      
    
        
    
        
      
      
   
      
 
 77. See Richard Albert, Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the 
United States, 67 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 181, 182–83 (2014). 
 78. 1987 Constitutional Accord, Ottawa, Ontario, June 3, 1987 [hereinafter 
Meech Lake Accord]. 
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most routine matters of governance.77 The impetus behind
quasi-constitutional amendment, then, is the difficulty of 
formal amendment.
A. The Legacies of Formal Amendment Failure 
Where constitutional actors determine, correctly or not,
that the current political landscape would frustrate their
plans for a constitutional amendment to entrench new policy
preferences, they resort instead to sub-constitutional means
whose successful execution requires less or perhaps even no 
cross-party or inter-institutional coordination. Their resort
to sub-constitutional procedures reflects a strategic choice to 
circumvent the onerous rules of formal amendment in order
to alter the operation of a set of existing norms in the 
constitution. In Canada, the political choice to chart a sub-
constitutional path to constitutional change has been
informed, if not compelled, by the modern legacies of formal
amendment failure.
The 1987 Meech Lake and 1992 Charlottetown Accords 
promised transformative constitutional changes on the scale 
of Patriation. Meech Lake would have recognized the 
distinctiveness of Quebec within Canada, changed how
senators are selected, constitutionalized the Supreme Court,
and granted provinces new powers over immigration and
constitutional amendment.78 Charlottetown would have gone 
even further, for instance, introducing a “Canada Clause” to 
express national values, redefining the federal distribution
of powers, recognizing Aboriginal rights, reforming national
institutions including the House of Commons, the Senate 
and the Supreme Court, and moreover, amending the rules
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of constitutional amendment.79 Yet both major packages of 
amendments were defeated, the Meech Lake Accord as a
result of an elapsed ratification deadline,80 and the 
Charlottetown Accord at the hands of the people in an extra-
constitutional referendum.81 
These failures have not been without consequence.
Writing in 1994, Edward McWhinney observed that
“Canadians as a whole are tired of the seemingly unending
constitutional debate of the last three and half decades which
has pre-empted consideration by Ottawa of other, deemed
more pressing, economic problems.”82 Beyond just
constitutional fatigue, however, Warren Newman has more 
recently suggested that formal amendment failure has had
an “incalculable impact on our national psyche and on the 
way in which our political actors approach the question of 
constitutional reform.”83 Newman described the effect of our
formal amendment failure as a “trauma,” and concluded that
“[i]t may not yet be a propitious time for Canada’s political
leaders to ‘reopen’ the Constitution in a broad and concerted
way.”84 The time may never yet come.
For constitutional actors, the prime directive is self-
preservation. If indeed Canadians have grown tired of 
constitutional debates, elected constitutional actors will heed
that caution and remember well that the Conservative 
79. GOV’T CAN., CONSENSUS REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTION: CHARLOTTETOWN,
FINAL TEXT 417–18, 420–21, 423, 435 (1992) [hereinafter Charlottetown Accord].
80. See Richard Albert, Temporal Limitations in Constitutional Amendment, 
21 REV. CONST. STUD. 37, 52–53 (2016).
81. See Richard Albert, The Conventions of Constitutional Amendment in
Canada, 53 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 399, 401–02 (2016).
82. Edward McWhinney, Quebec and Canadian Federalism, 2 CAN.
PARLIAMENTARY REV. 1, 3 (1994).
83. Warren J. Newman, Living with the Amending Procedures: Prospects for
the Future of Constitutional Reform in Canada, 37 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 383, 407
(2007).
84. Id.
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government was routed at the polls not coincidentally the 
year after Charlottetown’s defeat.85 Whether Canadians 
would be open to a new round of major constitutional change 
is an empirical question in need of fresh data drawn from
generations since Meech Lake and Charlottetown. But
perception often overruns reality, and today we regard
constitutional politics in Canada as inhospitable to major
formal constitutional reforms due to what Michael Lusztig
has described as the need for “mass input” and
“legitimization,”86 shorthand for the nearly impossible 
political agreement by parties with incommensurable 
interests that almost inevitably doom comprehensive 
constitutional change involving federalism.
B. The New Path to Institutional Reform 
No wonder, then, that a non-constitutional path to 
institutional reform has replaced the constitutional route. As
Harvey Lazar observed in 1997, this is “a necessary step for
healing the wounds of the country”,87 certainly “the only
politically viable option for managing the federation”88 after
decades of nearly uninterrupted attention to constitution-
level changes.89 Whether on fiscal, social, environmental, or
aboriginal policy, constitutional actors carefully avoid the “c-
word.”90 The parliamentary recognition of Quebec as a
distinct society, for instance, joins with the Regional Veto 
Law and the new appointment process to illustrate the 
85. See DAVID MCLAUGHLIN, POISONED CHALICE: THE LAST CAMPAIGN OF THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVE PARTY? 10–11 (1994).
86. Michael Lusztig, Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional
Initiatives are Doomed to Fail, 27 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 747, 748 (1994).
87. Harvey Lazar, Non-Constitutional Renewal: Toward a New Equilibrium
in the Federation, in CANADA: THE STATE OF THE FEDERATION 1997—NON-
CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL 3, 28 (Harvey Lazar ed., 1998).
88. Id. at 7.
89. See id. at 3.
90. See id. at 12–20.
   
       
        
    
     
        
     
      
     
      
       
       
     
      
     
     
     
       
      
        
         
       
     
      
       
      
       
       
  
       
       
        
 
 91. Lois Harder & Steve Patten, Looking Back on Patriation and its 
Consequences, in PATRIATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CONSTITUTION MAKING IN 
CANADA 3, 21 (Louis Harder & Steve Patten eds., 2015). 
 92. See Meech Lake Accord, supra note 78 §§ 2, 9; Charlottetown Accord, supra 
note 79, at 5. 
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“circuitous” ways that “changes of a constitutional character”
occur now and likely into the near future91 given the present
political improbability of constitutional amendment.
Resort to sub-constitutional means is a more profitable 
route for constitutional actors because it requires less or even
no cross-party or inter-institutional coordination. Both the 
Regional Veto Law and the Advisory Board for Senate 
appointments were the product of a majority government,
meaning that neither major change confronted any
substantial risk of failure. Each was promised near-certain
success in light of the few veto opportunities standing in
their way. Neither of these functionally constitution-level
changes required support from the opposition or the 
provinces to become effective, though one could argue that
each of them changed the basic structure of the Constitution,
and therefore should have required a deeper measure of 
approval across political parties or levels of government.
The Regional Veto Law and the new process for Senate 
appointments were introduced at a much lower political cost
than ordinarily required for an amendment, yet both amount
to the functional equivalent of a formal amendment. Both, in
fact, were part of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown
Accords, though in different but recognizable forms: the 
precursor to the Regional Veto Law was proposed as a
provincial veto and the new process for Senate appointments
would have, in the case of Meech, given provinces the power
of nomination, and in Charlottetown it would have created a
Triple-E Senate.92 
The Regional Veto Law, an ordinary law, has had two 
extraordinary consequences. First, it has achieved what
Meech and Charlottetown could not—and importantly it did
      
      
     
        
      
     
       
     
      
     
       
      
      
      
     
       
          
        
      
 
     
         
      
        
     
     
   
     
     
     
        
    
     
 
 93. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 59, § 41. 
 94. Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, para. 2. (Can.). 
 95. Bill C-7, An Act Respecting the Selection of Senators and Amending the 
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so outside of the formal amendment process. Quebec now has
the veto promised to it. Moreover, the effect of the Regional
Veto Law is substantial insofar as it effectively amends the 
rules of constitutional amendment by imposing formal
requirements over and above those established by the 
Constitution itself. What is important here is that the 
Regional Veto Law changes the formal amendment rules— 
specifically, the multilateral default procedure—by way of a
simple federal law in defiance of the formal rules of 
amendment themselves which by their very text require the 
agreement of Parliament and of each provincial assembly to 
amend any part of the Constitution’s formal amendment
rules.93 And yet the enacting Parliament expected
constitutional actors to nonetheless abide by the Regional
Veto Law despite its inconsistency with the formal rules of 
amendment. Even though it is an ordinary law that did not
earn its functionally special status through any of the formal
routes, the Constitution provides for achieving special
status.
The new process for Senate appointments has likewise 
achieved what neither Meech nor Charlottetown could: it has
changed the way Senators are selected. Reading the recent
Senate Reference would suggest that changes to the method
of senator selection require a constitutional amendment. The 
relevant issue in the Senate Reference was the 
constitutionality of the Senate Reform and Senate 
Appointments Consultation bills.94 These bills proposed to 
create a framework of consultative provincial and territorial
elections to fill Senate vacancies. The Senate Reform bill
proposed that senators “should be chosen from a list of 
Senate nominees submitted by the government of the 
province or territory,”95 with the list of nominees “to be 
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determined by an election held in the province or territory.”96 
The bill furthermore insisted that the prime minister “must
consider names from the most current list of Senate 
nominees selected for that province or territory” when
“recommending Senate nominees to the Governor
General.”97 The Senate Appointments Consultation bill had
the same objective: to constrain the prime minister to 
consider provincial or territorial consultative election
winners for appointment to the Senate.98 
The operative question in the Senate Reference was 
“whether Parliament, acting alone, can reform the Senate by
creating consultative elections to select senatorial nominees
endorsed by the populations of the various provinces and
territories.”99 The Court rejected the two major arguments
for the bills.100 First, the Court was not convinced by the 
argument that creating a framework for consultative 
senatorial elections does not constitute an amendment
simply because the formal process for appointing individuals
to the Senate—by official summoning by the Governor
General on the advice of the prime minister, as required by
the 1867 Constitution Act101—remains unchanged.102 The 
Court refused to accept this argument because, the Court
observed, doing so would “privilege[] form over substance,”103 
and would ignore that such a change “would fundamentally
Constitution Act, 1867 in Respect of Senate Term Limits, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 
2011, § 1 [hereinafter Senate Reform Bill].
96. Id. § 2.
97. Id. § 3.
98. See Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R., para. 62 (Can.).
99. Id. para. 49.
100. Id. at 706.
101. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c 3 §§ 24, 32 (U.K.).
102. See Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. at 735.
103. Id. para. 52.
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alter the architecture of the Constitution.”104 An 
amendment, then, according to the Court, is more than a
formal alteration to the constitutional text,105 though the 
Court could have been more definitive on what in fact counts
as an amendment.106 
Nor was the Court persuaded that the text of the formal
amendment rules is unclear; on the contrary, the Court noted
that the multilateral default amendment procedure states
plainly that it must be used for changes to “the method of 
selecting senators.”107 For the Court, this phrase “covers the 
implementation of consultative elections, indicating that a
constitutional amendment is required and making that
amendment subject to the general procedure [in Section
38].”108 The Court continued: “[t]he words ‘the method of 
selecting senators’ include more than the formal
appointment of senators by the Governor General.”109 It 
includes all changes to the method of senatorial selection,
beyond and including those related directly to the act of 
appointment itself.110 
Yet today senators are selected under a new process that
differs from how they have historically been chosen. The 
Senate has been reformed, but not in the large-scale fashion 
many have sought since Confederation; change has instead
come incrementally, without engaging the formal
104. Id. para. 53.
105. Id. para. 52.
106. See Kate Glover, Complexity and the Amending Formula, 24 CONST. F. 9,
11 (2015); see also Emmett Macfarlane, Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the
Senate Reference, and the Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 60
MCGILL L.J. 883, 900 (2015).
107. Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] 1 S.C.R. para. 64 (quoting
Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 59, § 42(b)(1)).
108. Id.
109. Id. para. 65 (quoting Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 59, § 42(b)(1)).
110. Id.
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amendment process.111 Formal appointment continues to be 
made by the Governor General, but the selection process
itself has changed as a result of the Advisory Board which
advises the prime minister according to public criteria that
now bring to light at least part of what has in the past
remained concealed. Whether the new process for Senate 
appointments is an improvement on the previous method of 
senator selection is not the point, although it does seem to 
democratize a body that has long been inaccessible to many
Canadians.112 The point is that senator selection has
changed in a material way. Although the prime minister
retains the discretion to choose whom to nominate, the range 
of discretion is narrowed. The creation of the Advisory Body
is a significant change that would have been appropriately
passed as a constitutional amendment had it been possible 
to amend the Constitution without opening the door to 
collateral matters. Paradoxically, the choice not to formalize 
the new process in a law, and instead to promulgate it
informally, has perhaps saved it from unconstitutionality.
Yet there can be no doubt that the new process is in fact new,
and that it changes the way senators are selected—for better
or worse.
What remains to be seen about both the Regional Veto 
Law and the new process of Senate appointments is whether
they will endure with time. Under the right conditions, a
quasi-constitutional amendment may ultimately grow as
durable as a formal amendment, and it may be that the 
conditions surrounding both the Regional Veto Law and the 
new process are right for them to endure.
There are at least three conditions that foster the 
durability of a quasi-constitutional amendment. First, the 
111. Bruce M. Hicks, Can a Middle Ground be Found on Senate Numbers?, 16
CONST. F. 21, 21 (2007).
112. For an argument that enhancing the democratic character of the Senate
appointments process cannot justify circumventing the rigid formal amendment 
rules, see Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Stealth, 60 MCGILL L.J.
673, 678–80 (2015).
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amendment must concern an important matter of public
policy. Second, the matter must be one that has in the past
proven difficult to resolve by amendment. Third, the 
amendment must bring relative constitutional peace to the 
issue, defusing the subject and removing it from the 
foreground of the political process. The Regional Veto Law
and the new process of Senate appointments appear to meet
each of these three conditions, which perhaps explains why
the Quebec question has for now receded to the background
of constitutional politics in Canada, as well as why reform
regarding the perennially controversial question about the 
proper role, membership, and function of the Senate may 
soon follow. Constitutional actors are instead focusing on
other matters deemed higher priorities—at least in some 
part a function of the success of the quasi-constitutional
amendments that were introduced outside of the formal
process of constitutional amendment.
There is an important difference between the quasi-
constitutional amendment resulting from the Regional Veto 
Law and the one resulting from the new process of Senate 
appointments: the former emerged from the legislative 
process and the latter did not. This difference—call it the 
difference between executive-led quasi-constitutional
amendments and Parliament-led quasi-constitutional
amendments—may lead us to conclude that one is more 
legitimate than the other insofar as the legislative process is
ordinarily more public, transparent, and deliberative than
the decision-making process that occurs almost exclusively
internally within the executive branch.
CONCLUSION: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ITS MODERN 
FORMS 
I have sought in this brief overview to identify a concept
and to illustrate it with three examples, one prior to 
Patriation, and two afterwards. There may well be others,
including perhaps the Clarity Act passed into law after the 
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Quebec Secession Reference.113 The takeaway is that quasi-
constitutional amendments occupy the space between
constitutional and ordinary law. Neither constitutional nor
ordinary, they float sometimes uneasily between these two 
worlds, complicating our understanding of how a
constitution is made, what it is, and where to find it.
A. The Paradoxes of Quasi-Constitutionality 
Perhaps because of their unsteady status, quasi-
constitutional amendments raise two paradoxes for the 
theory and doctrine of constitutional change. First, although
they become effective with recourse to sub-constitutional
means, quasi-constitutional amendments may nonetheless
over time acquire constitutional status as a result of their
subject-matter or importance. This reflects a mismatch
between their adoption and their effect. Ordinarily, special
status derives at least in part from an equally special period
of creation, whether by constitutional amendment requiring
heightened legislative or popular thresholds or a self-
conscious recognition and attendant declaration by the 
enacting body that the law or measure demands special
solicitude.
Second, although quasi-constitutional amendments may
rank higher than ordinary law in the constitutional
hierarchy, they may sometimes be closer to 
unconstitutionality than constitutionality. Precisely because 
they arise sub-constitutionally, yet purport to and maybe in
fact do enjoy special status in legislatures, in courts of law,
or in the public square, quasi-constitutional amendments
cannot validly claim the legal, sociological, and procedural
legitimacy that constitutionality requires. It is true that the 
absence of one form of legitimacy need not always result in
113. See generally An Act to give effect to the requirement for clarity as set out
in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Secession
Reference, 2d Sess., 36th Parl., 1999.
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unconstitutionality. For instance, the adoption of the United
States Constitution in violation of the rules of change in the 
Articles of Confederation shows how sociological legitimacy
may overcome procedural illegality.114 This, however, is an
exception to the general rule that constitutional status
derives from the convergence of legal recognition, sociological
acceptance, and procedural correctness. Because quasi-
constitutional amendments lack these three features, they
quite controversially verge on the border of 
unconstitutionality, and indeed courts would be justified in
invalidating them even in the face of high popular and
political support for these constitution-level changes made 
sub-constitutionally. The Regional Veto Law, for example, is
quite possibly unconstitutional. I believe the same to be true 
of provincial laws requiring binding referenda before 
provincial assemblies can consider ratifying an amendment
proposal.115 
Yet quasi-constitutional amendments have an important
function in constitutional democracies. They offer
constitutional actors a way to update the constitution
informally without recourse to onerous rules of 
constitutional amendment. If these rules were followed
without exception for any constitution-level change, they
could effectively freeze the constitution and fate it to a
chronic incapacity to respond to the modern challenges of 
evolving political and cultural norms and of changing social
and economic conditions. This interplay between
constitutional and ordinary rules of change can be 
understood in terms of Heather Gerken’s hydraulics theory
of constitutional change: where the path to formal
amendment is or seems to be blocked due to its difficulty,
constitutional actors redirect their energies toward
114. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 84 (1998).
115. See Richard Albert, The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendment in Canada, 41 QUEEN’S L.J. 143, 177–78 (2015).
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alternative paths to produce the same or a similar outcome,
though with a different form.116 
B. Constitutional Form and the Rule of Law 
The question, then, is whether anything of significance 
turns on form. In Canada, we can look to the Supreme Court
for guidance as to why form matters. The answer is, quite 
simply, the rule of law. The Court has articulated a text-
centric conception of the rule of law “requir[ing] that courts
give effect to the Constitution’s text, and apply, by whatever
its terms, legislation that conforms to that text.”117 These 
positivist foundations of the rule of law are not without
normative commitments. Indeed, the Court has explained
that the rule of law entails respect for three principles: the 
supremacy of law over both public and private actors, the 
legal regulation of interactions between public and private 
actors, and the establishment and maintenance of positive 
laws that reflect an order of normative values.118 For the 
Court, it is the text that should drive the evolution of law.
The Court has moreover suggested that normative values,
however they may be discovered and applied, must cohere 
with the text: the rule of law, the Court wrote, “is not an
invitation to trivialize or supplant the Constitution’s written
terms.”119 
Constitutional actors have pushed the boundaries of 
constitutional form in their pursuit of constitutional
reform.120 Whether the reforms are needed is only one 
116. See Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A 
Skeptical Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 929
(2007).
117. British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473,
para. 67 (Can.).
118. Id. para. 58.
119. Id. para. 67.
120. See Mark D. Walters, The Constitutional Form and Reform of the Senate:
Thoughts on the Constitutionality of Bill C-7, 7 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 37– 
38, 48–49 (2013).
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question; another perhaps more important one probes the 
consequences of making major constitutional changes
outside of the formal rules of constitutional change 
entrenched in the Constitution of Canada.
In one view, quasi-constitutional amendments
undermine the integrity of the Constitution because they
trade on the vulnerabilities of constitutional form. They
exploit the partially codified and uncodified nature of the 
Constitution of Canada to introduce from the back door
changes that are not possible through the front. The long-
term results are uncertainty about what has constitutional
status, a disjunction between constitutional text and
practice, and no clear roadmap for how constitutional actors
may change the constitution or whether the rules in the 
constitutional text reflect either the necessary or sufficient
conditions for constitutional reform.
In another view, quasi-constitutional amendment is an
innovative strategy to update a rigid constitution that
otherwise frustrates constitutional reform. It matters less
how we change the constitution than that it changes at all
because the constitution should reflect the preferences of 
constitutional actors and the people they represent. Where 
the constitution ceases to accommodate the needs of the 
community it governs, it exposes itself as a tool of governance 
poorly designed to serve its intended function. The argument
from this view would continue as follows: were constitutional
actors to deny themselves recourse to innovations like quasi-
constitutional amendment, the consequence could be that
the constitution fails to endure in moments when the 
pressure for change continues to build over a long period of 
time without the possibility of any change ever bringing
relief.
For now, the latter view is dominant in Canada.121 
121. See Allan C. Hutchinson, Constitutional Change and Constitutional
Amendment: A Canadian Conundrum, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE:
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Constitutional actors have forged new paths to institutional
reform outside of the formal rules of constitutional change.122 
Whether these paths point the way to the future remains to 
be seen, but there is yet no sign to suggest otherwise.
Constitutional actors have grown comfortable operating in
the space between constitutional and ordinary law, though
perhaps less out of preference than out of necessity. But only
so much constitutional change is possible through judicial
interpretation, particularly where the targets of change are 
“hard-wired” into the constitution, and not as cleanly
changeable by interpretation123 as might be the case for
interpreting a right cast at a high level of abstraction. On
matters of constitutional structure, constitutional actors
today may have no other option but quasi-constitutional
amendment because the road to major formal amendment
appears closed.
Many questions present themselves for future research.
I raise two of them here. First, what should be the process
for repealing or revising a quasi-constitutional amendment?
They are ordinarily entrenched, and therefore subject to 
ordinary repeal or revision in terms of the parliamentary
threshold required. But so are quasi-constitutional statutes,
with the important wrinkle that they may be repealed or
revised only with clear legislative language. Should the same 
rule apply to quasi-constitutional amendments? Second,
given the extraordinary difficulty of formal amendment in
Canada, should we not expect to see more quasi-
constitutional amendments—many more than the ones
identified in this Article? The first question requires a more 
elaborate answer than is possible in these pages. The answer
to the second likewise requires more research to explain, but
is a bit less of a mystery. Much of the change we would expect
to see as a result of the rigidity of the Constitution has been
A COMPARA.TIVE PERSPECTIVE ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA 51, 56–57 
(Xenophon Contiades ed., 2013).
122. Id.
123. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 29 (2006).
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redirected from the channels of formal amendment to the 
sphere of judicial interpretation in Canadian courts. The 
reasons why constitutional rigidity in Canada has sometimes
led to quasi-constitutional amendments, and more often to 
informal amendment by judicial interpretation, will have to 
wait for another day.
